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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Petitioners prayed for a determination that it would 
be in the best interest of the minor child, Douglas Rex 
Izatt, that his care, custody and control be vested in 
them. The natural father of the child obtained a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus out of the Third Judicial District Court 
and in a hearing on that matter, the Distrct Court 
certified the matter back to the Juvenile Court for 
findings and an order with regard to custody. The District 
Court also ordered that after the recommendation of the 
Juvenile Court the case would then be returned to the 
District Court for a final hearing on the issue of custody, 
pursuant to the ~frit of Habeas Corpus. 
DISPOS:;:TION IN LOWER COURT 
The Juvenile Court made an order, prior to the 
close of petitioner's case, dismissing part of the petition, 
and later, and also prior to the close of petitioner's case, 
made a final order of dismissal. The final order of dis-
missal did not refer the matter back to the District Court 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek a judgment reversing the lower court's 
order of partial dismissal and the final order of dismissal. 
with directions to permit petitioners to complete their case 
in chief in the Juvenile Court and thereafter, following 
1 
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the entry of findings and a recommendation in the Juvenile 
Court, for an order that the matter be referred back to the 
District Court for final determination of custody pursuant 
to the Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
STATE~!ENT OF FACTS 
Viewing the record in a light favoring the success-
ful party below, the evidence demonstrates the following: 
1. On January 27, 1975 a Decree of Divorce awarding 
custody to the natural mother of the minor child, Judith 
H. Izatt, was entered granting reasonable rights of visit-
ation in the child's natural father, Sheldon J. Izatt. 
This order was entered following a disputed custody 
struggle in the divorce action which was resolved on 
stipulation of the parties after the parties had submitted 
to and r-eceived a custody evaluation. 
2. On February 25, 1975, Judity H. Izatt, the 
natural mother of the child, Douglas Rex Izatt, was killed 
in an auto-pedestrian accident. 
3. On February 28, 1975, the District Juvenile 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, entered an order placing 
the temporary custody of the aforesaid minor child in his 
maternal grandmother, Ina Hellstrom, with whom the child 
and his mother had been living for more than one year prior 
thereto. This order of temporary custody was based on the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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petition of the maternal grandmother and the maternal 
aunt and uncle, appellants herein. 
4. The initial petition for temporary custody 
alleged, among other things: 
(a) The child's mother had recently been killed 
in an auto-pedestrian accident. 
(b) That said 3 year old minor child had lived 
continuously with his mother and maternal grand-
mother in the maternal grandmother's home for 
more than one year immediately prior to the 
filing of the petition. 
(c) That custody of the child had been awarded 
to his mother in a disputed divorce action. 
(d) That the child's father was living with a 
woman he was not married to, had no residence 
of his own, and had failed to support the minor 
child for six months prior to the death of his 
mother. 
(e) That when the child returned from visits with 
his father, the child came home bruised and dis-
turbed and had picked up using foul language. (T. 220 Pictzd 
(f) That a home evaluation should be made to 
determine the most suitable home for the child. 
5. On March 10, 1975 a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
was issued directing that the minor child be brought 
before the Third Judicial Court and dealt with according 
to law and a hearing was set for March 21, 1975. 
6. On March 13, 1975 a pre-trial conference was 
held in the Juvenile Court on the petition of the 
maternal grandmother and maternal aunt and uncle, the 
appellants herein. At that time the court appointed 
Michael Stead, Deputy County Attorney, as guardian ad 
litem for the child and also as attorney for the child. 
3 
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The Juvenile Court continued custody in the maternal 
grandmother pursuant to the order of February 28, 1975, 
and continued the pre-trial to March 24, 1975, pending a 
determination in the District Court on the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus. 
7. On March 21, 1975 a hearing on the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus was held resulting in an order as follows: 
1. The question of the custody of the minor 
child, Douglas Rex Izatt, is certified to 
the District Juvenile Court in and for Salt 
Lake County for determination pursuant to 
55-10-78 U.C.A. as amended. 
2. That the Writ of Habeas Corpus herein is 
continued without date. 
3. That following the hearing in Juvenile Court, 
the Juvenile Court shall make findings and 
an order with regard to custody and refer 
the matter back to the District Court for 
final hearing on the Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
4. The petitioner's motion that the temporary 
order of the Juvenile Court vesting custody 
in respondents be vacated is denied. 
5. That there is no continuing jurisdiction 
in the divorce action, Civil No. D-13106, 
with regard to the question of custody, 
as referred to in 55-10-78 U.C.A., as 
amended in 1971, due to the death of one 
of the parties thereto, Judith H. Izatt, 
defendant therein. 
8. On March 24, 1975 the pre-trial was held in 
the Juvenile Court and Judge Larson observed with regard 
thereto, 
4 
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"Now if we are riding the District Court horse 
that doesn't become critical, I suppose, but I 
just evaluate what information is available and 
make a recommendation to the District Court. 
That doesn't turn on the question of neglect, it 
seems to me. It turns on what appears at this 
point. I suppose it would be in the best 
interest of the child, wouldn't it? (T.13,P.12-19) 
At this hearing the State of Utah asked leave to 
withdraw and the same was permitted by Judge Larson. The 
minor child was three years old at the time. 
9. Following the hearing on the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus in the District Court, at which time the maternal 
grandmother had temporary custody of the minor child by 
virtue of the Order of Temporary Placement of the Juvenile 
Court, dated February 23, 1975, the natural father was 
permitted to visit with the child once a week, and custody 
was continued in the maternal grandmother. 
10. On May 20, 1975, a hearing was held on Petitioners 
Motion For A Psychological Examination of the minor child 
and the natural father. The petition was joined in by the 
attorney for the child, Michael Stead, and the court granted 
the motion. The Court ordered the maternal aunt and uncle, 
appellants herein, to pay for the psychological examinations 
11. On March 28, 1975 the maternal grandmother of 
the child died of a heart attack. 
12. On April 1, 1975, the Court placed the temporarv 
custody and guardianship of the minor child with the 
5 
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natural father, subject to the protective supervision of 
the Division of Family Services and advised the maternal 
aunt and uncle to turn the child over to the father. The 
Court further advised the father of the child to permit the 
maternal aunt and uncle to visit with the child and that 
request was frustrated and specifically thwarted by the 
father's counsel who stated that he had directed his client 
not to let them visit with the child. (T. 208) 
13. On August 8, 1975 a motion to amend the petition 
and for a psychological examination of the natural father's 
present wife came on for hearing. !1ichael Stead, the 
attorney and guardian for the child joined in the petition 
and Dr. H. Max Cutler testified with regard to the advis-
ability thereof. The court granted the motion and ordered 
petitioners to pay the expenses of the psychological 
examination as well as the psychological examinations on 
the father of the child. 
The amended petition alleged new information 
received as a result of the psychological examinations of 
the minor child and his father. The new matter alleged is 
as follows: 
The said Sheldon J. Izatt is unfit and/or 
incompetent by reason of conduct or condition 
seriously detrimental to the child as follows: 
6 
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CONDUCT 
(a) The father has neglected and/or abused the 
child physically on more than one occasion. 
(b) The father's conduct is both amoral and 
asocial. 
(c) The father has set an example of prevari-
cation, immorality and vulgarity, which is 
seriously detrimental to the welfare of the 
child. 
(d) The wife of the natural father of said 
child, who has the actual care, custody and 
control of the child for most of his waking 
hours, has threatened the boy with castration. 
This extremely negative approach to discipline 
can have serious psychological consequences 
in terms of severe sexual and emotional conflicts 
for years to come. 
CONDITION 
(a) ·The father has massive hostility, expressed 
both in acting out and projecting the same in 
others. The child becomes the victim of direct 
hostility as well as being the object of pro-
jected hostility. 
(b) The father is of significantly lower 
intelligence than the child, and it is more 
probable than not that the child will not 
develop to his potential, if custody remains 
with his father. 
(c) The father's present wife, and her five 
children, from two previous marriages, are of 
significantly lower intelligence than said child 
and it is more probable than not, that the child 
will not develop to his potential if he continues 
to reside with said persons. 
14. On October 17, 1975 the raatter came on for trial 
and petitioners called as their first witness the natural 
father of the child at which time the court ruled that 
the petitioners would have to subpeona the natural father 
in order to make him a witness. The natural father did not 
7 
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appear on the first day of trial nor at any other time 
nor at any of the motions in the Juvenile Court. 
15. On the first day of the trial and before the 
close of evidence, the natural father, by and through 
his attorney, made a motion to dismiss which was granted 
as to paragraphs la - le under conduct of petitioners' 
amended petition. The motion was taken under advisement 
and at the time of the hearing Judge Larson observed as 
follows: 
"One thing that bothers me is that Mr. Goodwill 
had not rested. If he's got his evidence in on 
these points, then I could make a ruling." 
(T. 179, L. 7-9) 
Opposing counsel then gave as his reason for a 
prohibition against calling the father of the child as 
petitioners' witness that the court should assume what 
he would say before he said it, when counsel for the father 
states as follows: 
Your Honor, as a matter of common sense, the 
defendant assuming whether he is guilty or 
not guilty, whether he is a liar or not, 
Mr. Goodwill is never going to be able to 
prove that he is a liar and assuming that he 
is telling the truth, he is certainly going 
to deny neglecting, beating, and living with 
a woman. If that's the rest of his case it's 
no case. (T. 181, L. 7-13.) 
16. On December 1, 1975, the Court entered an order 
of partial dismissal, based on counsel for the father's motion, 
as the paragraph la through le under conduct, of petitioners' 
8 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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amended petition, without first giving petitioner a chance 
to examine the natural father as a witness and continued 
the matter for a trial as to paragraph ld conditions and 
la through le under conduct to December 15, 1975. That 
date was striken and the matter was reset for trial to the 
date of April 15, 1976. 
17. On April 15, 1976, counsel for petitioner 
appeared in Juvenile Court with the intent of completing 
his case in chief, but instead, the court permitted counsel 
for the natural father to put on a witness in support of 
his renewed motion to dismiss the remaining portions of 
the petition. 
18. During the hearing of April 15, 1976, the 
Court, without notice or hearing, stated that a Mr. John 
Soltis had been appointed as guardian for the child and 
Mr. Soltis, it was determined had theretofore met with 
the attorney for the natural father and based on the 
information given to him by the attorney for the natural 
father joined in a motion to dismiss. This motion was 
made, once again, prior to the close of petitioners' case. 
Petitioner had been unable at this time to 
put on the expert witness, Dr. Victor B. Cline, who had 
examined the child at the expense of petitioner, and had 
also been unable to examine either the father or the 
9 
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father's new wife. 
The Court permitted the natural father to 
examine a social worker in support of his motion to dismiss. 
The social worker had visited the home of the natural father. 
The social worker made many recommendations and statements 
which would require her to have been established as an 
expert witness. The Court then granted petitioners' motion 
to strike all of the social worker's testimony, except that 
testimony that related to her actual observations of the 
child or of the home of the father and the conditions 
therein. 
Counsel for petitioner objected to the 
appointment of Mr. John Soltis, as attorney for the child, 
on the basis that said attorney had met with opposing 
counsel prior to his official appointment, there had 
been no notice of his appointment, and he had not spoken 
with counsel for petitioner nor investigated any of the 
facts from the standpoint of petitioners' theory, nor 
had he been present at any of the prior hearings, and on 
the basis that he was not acting in the best interests of 
the child. Over objection, the Court appointed Mr. Soltis 
guardian for the child and further granted the motion to 
dismiss petitioners' entire petition. 
10 
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POINT I 
THE GRANTING OF A SECOND MID-TRIAL MOTION TO DISMISS 
PETITIONERS' AMENDED PETITION BEFORE THE CLOSE OF PETITIONERS' 
CASE IN CHIEF IS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
The attorney for the child, Michael Stead, was a joint 
signator with counsel for petitioner in his Motion to Amend 
the petition to include conduct or condition seriously 
detrimental to the child based on subsequent psychological 
examinations of the natural father and the minor child and 
a threatened castration of the minor child by the child's 
stepmother. 
During the trial and before petitioner had completed 
its case in chief, counsel for the natural father made a 
motion to dismiss petitioners' amended petition. Judge 
Larson questioned the propriety of granting a motion to 
dismiss before petitioners had rested their case and he 
observed as follows: 
"One thin~ that bothers me is that Mr. Goodwill had 
not reste . If he's his evidence in on these 
points ten I cou ma ea ruing. T. , L. to 9) 
At the time of the motion to dismiss the amended 
petition, Michael Stead, the court appointed attorney for 
the minor child opposed the motion to dismiss with regard 
to the portions of the amended petition which related to 
the pyschological examinations of the father and the child 
as follows: 
11 
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". . . (H) owever, I am concerned about the 
emotional and mental ability of this father 
to adefuately take care of the child and 
would ike more information as to that . . " 
On the 1st day of December, 1975, the court 
entered an order partially dismissing petitioners' 
amended petition and denied the same with regard to the 
condition which related to the psychological examinations 
performed on the father, the child and the step-mother 
and with regard to the alleged conduct of the child's 
stepmother as to a threat to castrate the child. 
The case had been continued for trial to December 15th, 
1975 but was re-set for trial for April 15th, 1976. On 
April 15, 1976 Mr. John Soltis, a Deputy County Attorney, 
was appointed guardian ad litem for the child. Mr. 
Soltis had met with counsel for the father prior to the 
hearing but had not been officially appointed by the court, 
nor had there been notice or hearing as to his appointment. 
It was admitted that he had not been present at the prior 
hearings nor during the trial itself. Mr. Soltis admitted 
that he had spoken with counsel for the father, with the 
child and a case worker, but that he had not spoken with 
the natural father, had not spoken with the step-mother, and 
had not spoken with any of petitioners' expert witnesses 
nor had he spoken with petitioners' counsel. 
12 
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Petitioner's counsel objected to Mr. Soltis appearing 
for the child at which time the court appointed him guardian 
ad lit em for the child, (T. 182, L. 26) did not appoint him 
attorney for the child, and Mr. Soltis joined in counsel 
for the father's motion to dismiss the petition. This was 
the same motion that had been denied in part on December 1, 
1975. 
At the time of the granting of the motion to dismiss 
the petition in total, petitioner still had not been able 
to finish its case in chief. Petitioner had paid for three 
psychological examinations and engaged and paid for the 
services of two well respected psychologists, Dr. H. Max 
Cutler and Dr. Victor B. Cline. Petitioner had not had 
an opportunity to examine as hostile witnesses, the father 
of the child, and the step-mother of the child; or the 
psychologist who examined the child Dr. Victor B. Cline, 
despite the fact that counsel for the father had stipulated 
that Dr. Cline be permitted to testify and lay the ground 
work and basis for Dr. Cutler's testimony, and also to 
testify independently based on his examination of the 
minor child. (T. 157, L. 1-11) 
Rule 41 (b), U.R.C.P., provides that, 
"After the laintiff, in an 
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Since the motion to dismiss was granted prior to the 
close of petitioner's evidence, and before petitioner had 
the opportunity to examine a number of witnesses, the court 
should reverse the decision of the Juvenile Court pursuant 
to Rule 41 (b), U.R.C.P. and remand the case back for 
further proceedings in conformity with the court's opinion. 
The order of partial dismissal of petitioners' 
amended petition, dated December 1, 1975, should be 
reversed and remanded with the same directions and for 
the same reasons. 
POINT II 
THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED IN DISmssrnG PETITIONERS' 
PETITION AND IN FAILING TO MAKE FINDINGS AND AN ORDER 
REFERRING THE MATTER BACK TO THE DISTRICT COURT FOR FINAL 
DETERMINATION ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS ORDERED BY 
THE DISTRICT COURT. 
When the natural father of the minor child filed 
his Writ of Habeas Corpus in the District Court a petition 
was pending in the Juvenile Court. The petitioners and 
the maternal grandmother had filed the petition in the 
Juvenile Court and the Court had granted temporary custody 
14 
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to the maternal grandmother. 
The District Court certified the question of custody 
to the Juvenile Court with an order that findings be 
entered and that the case be referred back to the District 
Court for final resolution of the custody issue as it 
related to the Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
55-10-78, U.C.A. as amended, provides that 
" ... Nothing contained in this act shall deprive 
the District Courts of jurisdiction to appoint a 
guardian for a child, nor of jurisdiction to determine 
the custody of a child upon Writ of Habeas Corpus . 
provided that in case a petition involving the same 
child is endin in the Juvenile Court . . , the 
District Court s a certi the uestion o custod 
to the Juvenile Court etermination. 
A District Court may at any time decline to hass 
u on a uestion of custod and ma certif t e 
uestion to t e Juveni e Court or etermination 
Emphasis a e 
In re State ex rel Thornton, 18 U. 2d 297, 422 P.2d 
199, (1967) the court defined the word "Determination" as 
used in the aforesaid statute as follows: 
The word determination in the statute providing that 
" ... a District Court may at any time decline to 
pass upon a question of custody and may certify that 
question to the Juvenile Court for determination 
or recommendation, does not mean that once a case is 
referred to the Juvenile Court, the decision of that 
Court is final." [Emphasis added.] 
The District Court in connection with the natural 
father's Writ of Habeas Corpus certified the question 
of custody to the Juvenile Court for findings and a 
15 
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recommendation. The Juvenile Court then dismissed 
petitioners' petition but made no findings, entered 
merely a temporary order of custody in the natural father, 
not a final order of custody, and did not refer the matter 
back to the District Court for a final determination on 
the Writ of Habeas Corpus as provided in the order of 
Judge Maurice Harding signed on the 28th day of April, 1975, 
and as directed inSS-10-78 U.C.A. as amended.(Statement of Facts P.4) 
Since the order of dismissal of the Juvenile Court 
was not only contrary to the aforesaid statute, but also 
contrary to the order which certified the custody issue 
back to the Juvenile Court, the order of Judge Larson 
should be reversed, the matter should be remanded for 
further proceedings in order that petitioners may complete 
their case in chief, and after the case in chief is com-
pleted, findings should be entered and a recoIIllllendation made 
to the District Court for a final determination on the Writ 
of Habeas Corpus. 
16 
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POINT III 
THE APPOINTMENT OF NEW COUNSEL AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM 
FOR THE CHILD WAS ERROR. 
On April 15, 1976 the matter came on for further 
trial and a Mr. John Soltis appeared and said Mr. Stead, 
attorney and guardian ad litem for the child had left 
the County Attorney's office and that Mr. Soltis replaced 
him and took over his cases. (T. 182 L. 11-12) 
Petitioners' counsel inquired of the Court whether or 
not Mr. Soltis had been appointed to represent the minor 
child. The Court then observed: 
I don't know that there was action appointing 
him. He took over Mr. Stead's work. (T. 1821.9-10) 
Petitioners' counsel inquired of the Court as to 
whether or not Mr. Stead had been appointed guardian ad 
litem and attorney for the child in his individual capacity 
or as a Deputy County Attorney. Petitioners' counsel 
inquired as follows: 
As I understand it, your Honor, he was not 
appointed as a Deputy County Attorney, that 
is the County Attorney's office was not 
appointed to represent the child, but ~r. 
Stead in his individual capacity was appointed 
to represent the child. (T. 182 L. 13-17) 
The Court responded: 
That is right is there any objection to my 
appointing Mr. Soltis at this time to 
represent the child? (T. 182 L. 18-19) 
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Petitioners' counsel objected on the basis that 
there had been no notice and that he had never had an 
opportunity to confer with Mr. Soltis. Mr. Soltis had 
conferred with and agreed to join with the father's 
attorney in a motion to dismiss. He did not even attempt 
to confer with counsel for petitioner. 
The Court, over objection, appointed Mr. Soltis 
guardian ad litem, but not attorney for the child when 
it observed: 
The Court will appoint Mr. Soltis as guardian 
ad litem. The matter before the Court is 
Mr. Schwobe's motion to dismiss. (T.1821. 26-27) 
The second day of trial had been continued twice due 
to Dr. H. Max Cutler's having suffered a heart attack and 
finally when the matter came on for the second day of 
trial on April 15, 1976, petitioners were denied an 
opportunity to finish their case in chief and the hearing 
was converted into one to determine the father's motion 
to dismiss. 
55-10-96, U.C.A. annotated as amended provides that: 
The Court may appoint counsel without such 
request if it deems representation necessary 
to nrotect the interest of the child. 
[Emphasis added.] 
In the instant case it is submitted that Mr. Soltis 
was improperly appointed, as one who does not obtain 
information about both sides of a case in an impartial 
manner to determine what is in the best interests of the 
child, cannot be said to be acting in the best interests 
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of the child nor to protect the interests of the child. In 
the instant case the former attorney for the child, Michael 
Stead, joined in the motion for psychological examinations 
of the father, the child and the stepmother of the child. 
He also observed with regard to his concern about the 
emotional condition of the father: 
I'm concerned about the emotional and mental 
abilit of the father to ade uatel take care 
o the chi and would like more in ormation 
about that. (T. 179 L. l-3) 
More information about the emotional and mental ability 
of the father to care for the child was not presented to 
the Court, as before any further witnesses were sworn and 
examined, the Court granted the motion to dismiss. 
In a case such as this one where the amended petition 
alleges that (1) the stepmother threatened to castrate the 
minor child, (2) the father had abused the child, (3) the 
father had massive hostility, (4) the father is of signif-
icantly lower intelligence than the child and it is more 
probable than not that the child will not develop to his 
potential, if custody remains with his father, and (5) 
that the father's present wife, and her five children 
from two previous marriages, are of significantly lower 
intelligence than said child and it is more probable than 
not, that the child will not develop to his potential if 
he continues to reside with said persons, it is respectfull' 
submitted that an attorney who fails to speak with the 
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father, the stepmother, the attorney for petitioners, and 
petitioners' two expert witnesses, is not acting to protect 
the interest of the child pursuant to 55-10-96, U.C.A. 
annotated as amended. The appointment of Mr. Soltis 
was, therefore, reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
The order of partial dismissal and the order 
dismissing petitioners' petition in its entirety should 
be reversed and the matter should be remanded for further 
proceedings in order that the petitioners may complete 
their case in chief, and after the case in chief is 
completed, findings should be entered and a recommendation 
made to the District Court for a final determination on 
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